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* 
The  socialist  economies  of  Eastern  Europe  did  not  have  any  property  system 
governing their productive activities (Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994, p. 11) 
 
Ownership is the back-bone of the economic system of Socialist countries (Knapp 1975, 
p. 64) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This essay synthesizes work on the property regime of Soviet-type societies, 
using examples from Romania. Its aim is to correct the assumption common among 
western economists and policy-makers that there was no property in socialist societies 
(see,  e.g.,  Frydman  and  Rapaczynski)  and  therefore  no  obstacles  to  privatization.  
On the contrary, socialist property was clearly articulated, and its organization had 
strong implications for how socialist firms might be privatized. Thus, what looked 
like a “property vacuum” to western advisors proved to be very full of property rules 
and relations, which impeded satisfactory privatization even years after the collapse of 
communist parties. 
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Anthropological  study  of  “actually  existing”  socialism  was  just  gathering 
momentum  when  the  events  of  1989  effectively  ended  its  existence  in  Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union.  Over twenty years of research had produced 
a variety of writing on processes of socialist planning, rural  political economy, 
kinship, gender, ritual, and ethnic and national identity. Collectively, these works 
were beginning to reveal the lineaments of how socialist societies operated and 
how they differed from each other. Summarizing one clear result, Ernest Gellner 
observed  that  socialism’s  defining  trait  was  the  exhaustive  invasion  of  the 
economic  by  the  political.  Perhaps  nowhere  else  was  the  phrase  “political 
economy” so apt a description. To grasp the intertwining of the political with the 
economic  (and  with  everything  else)  would  prove  essential  to  comprehending 
trajectories out of socialism after 1989. One area of which this was particularly true 
was  the  transformation  of  property,  in  a  process  usually  referred  to  as 
„privatization”.  Because the destruction of private property had been so central an 3  Property    39 
imperative  in  building  up  socialism  –  call  Marx  and  Engels’s  dictum  in  the 
Communist Manifesto, “The distinguishing feature of communism is the abolition 
of  bourgeois  property”  –  the  destruction  of  socialism  after  1989  meant  almost 
everywhere the recreation of private property. That process was soon to reveal, 
however – scholars, at least – the necessity of better understanding how property 
functioned in socialism.   
My task in this essay is to outline the politics of socialist property and to 
indicate what that meant for property after socialism.  This is not a topic with a 
wide anthropological literature. To be sure, anthropologists have long occupied 
themselves with describing property forms in various settings. Beginning in the 
1990s,  a  number  participated  in  the  resurgence  of  anthropological  interest  in 
property, investigating new property phenomena such as indigenous land claims, 
cultural  and  intellectual  property,  property  in  body  parts,  and t h e  p r o p e r t y  
implications of new reproductive technologies. Some of this work raises questions 
about  how  we  should  understand  property  and  whether  it  is  even  useful  as  an 
analytic  concept.  But  anthropologists  had  not  much  investigated  property  in 
socialist contexts, merely writing about life within socialist property organizations 
such  as  collective  farms  without  investigating  them  as  property f o r m s  p e r  s e .    
Most  of  what  we  know  about  socialist  property  has  come  from  legal  scholars  
(e.g., Knapp 1975 and Butler 1988) and economists (e.g., Kornai 1980, 1992).   
The  same  is  true  since  1989:  anthropologists  have  described  property 
transformation,  especially  the  dismantling  of  socialist  agriculture,  without 
systematically exploring the property forms of before. Debate (such as that evident 
in my two chapter epigraphs) comes primarily from lawyers, political scientists, 
and economists rather than anthropologists (who have nonetheless argued against 
the  simplistic  treatment  of  privatization  in  those  other  fields—objecting,  for 
instance, to the ethnocentric assumptions of the "bundle of rights" conception so 
widely  used  in  economics  and  legal  studies,  or  to  neo-institutionalist  analyses 
aimed  at  designing  market-based  property  regimes  from  the  top  down).  A 
particular target of my own work on the privatization of land (Verdery 2003) is the 
idea that socialism had no property order, and that as a result its collapse left a 
tabula rasa upon which new forms could be written unproblematically. I hold the 
view  that  socialism  had  a  distinctive  property  order,  though  its  categories  and 
operation differed fundamentally from those of market economies.  
To write of “property in socialism” reifies and homogenizes a reality that was 
much more complex, with variations occurring both across the region and through 
time.    In  the  space  available  to  me,  however,  I  can  offer  only  a  schematic, 
condensed account, aimed at clarifying the problems of making “private property” 
from the property relations of socialism in the former Soviet bloc (the literature 
upon  which  I  draw).  In  analyzing  socialist  property,  I  follow  Bronislaw 
Malinowski’s dictum and ask not just about ownership but about how socialism’s 
resources  were used. This strategy enables  me to examine socialist property in 
something like its own terms, instead of as a failed form of western property.   Catherine Verdery  4  40 
I should begin by stating how I understand the notion of property. I think of it 
as a  set of political, economic, cultural, and social constructs and relationships 
through which persons are related to one another by means of things, or values. 
Central to it are cultural idioms by which persons are defined and linked through 
social relations to one another and to values. Property is about boundary-making: it 
sets up inclusions and exclusions, “belongings”, such as what “belongs” to whom, 
and who belongs to or has affinities with some larger entity that occupies a relation 
to specific values or things. Along with this boundary-making, property is about 
appropriation, and thus about power. Power affects which actors and relations are 
recognized  or  privileged  in  a  given  understanding  of  property,  as  well  as 
permeating  the  wider  field  of  social  relations  in  which  persons  and  values  are 
linked.  Moreover,  the  ways  of  linking  persons  and  values  often  require 
adjudication  –  a  power-laden  process.  The  social  relations  of  property,  like  all 
social institutions, are rule-bound; power is inherent in setting and contesting those 
rules. In short, I see property as simultaneously a cultural system, a set of social 
relations, and an organization of power, all coming together in social processes.   
Using this framework, I organize my discussion as follows. First, I look at 
socialist  property  as  a  cultural  system:  what  kinds  of  categories  did  socialist 
systems  create  for  property?  Here  I  emphasize  the  categories  as  formally 
constituted in law; I discuss later on how they functioned in practice. Second, I 
consider it as a system of power and social relations: how did these categories 
become real, and what kinds of property relations were constituted thereby? How 
did a system based in ownership by “the whole people” break that entity down into 
smaller  ones  interacting  with  one  another  to  make  property  rights  effective?  I 
examine  how  resources  were  transacted  within  the  “unitary  fund”  of  socialist 
property and explore some of the stratagems by which actors strove to make its 
rigid constructs workable; my examples come mainly from socialist agriculture. I 
conclude by discussing some implications of this way of organizing property for its 
transformation after 1989. 
 
TYPES OF PROPERTY AND OWNERS UNDER SOCIALISM 
 
The outlines of socialist property as a cultural system emerge from inspecting 
its legal categories, as evident in legal texts. We should exercise care in reading 
them, for law did not occupy the same place in socialist societies as in western 
ones, and property was no exception. Under socialism it was less a legal and more 
an administrative matter; it was governed not by legal procedures aimed at creating 
regularity and certainty but by administrative measures, regarded as having the 
force of law though not created through a legislative process backed by courts. This 
said, however, it is worth inspecting the law because the categories employed in a 
society’s  laws  help  to  reveal  its  conceptual  foundations,  giving  a  sense  of  its 5  Property    41 
universe of both power and meaning, as well as of how these differ from those of 
other property regimes. 
Michael  Heller  observes  that  whereas  the  categories  of  market-based 
economic and legal systems focus on the scope of individual rights for each of 
several types of property – such as “real” and “personal” property, “tangible” and 
“intangible”  property,  or  state,  common,  and  private  property  –  socialist  legal 
categories  emphasized,  rather,  the  identity  of  the  owners,  the  property  types 
associated with each, and the social relations characterizing them (Heller 1998,  
p. 628). Socialist law recognized three principal kinds of owner: the state, socialist 
cooperatives, and individual persons or households. These related to four property 
types:  state  property,  cooperative  property
2,  personal  property,  and  private 
property. “The state” owned state property (though technically speaking, the owner 
was not the state but another abstract entity, “the whole people”); “cooperatives” 
owned cooperative property (technically, the owner was the collective membership 
of  that  cooperative,  not  a  larger  socialist  entity);  and  “individual”  households 
owned personal and private property, the two types being distinguished from each 
other in that personal property consisted of items of consumption, private property 
of means of production.   
State property/ownership was the most important of these types of property 
and owners; all other forms were subordinated to it. For example, in agriculture 
there  were  two  main  organizational  forms,  state  and  collective  farms.  In  all 
countries the cooperative property held jointly by members of a collective farm 
was ostensibly separate from state property. If a state farm were being expanded 
into the lands of that collective farm, however, state planners had no qualms about 
annexing the collective's land without acknowledging the joint rights of the farm 
members over it. Although for both cooperative and state property the property 
right was absolute, exclusive, inalienable, indivisible, and immune from attachment 
for debts, nonetheless “the state property right is more absolute than other property 
rights and than all other real rights” in civil law, and also more exclusive (Lupan 
and Reghini 1977, p. 54–55). In the words of a Romanian judge with whom I 
spoke,  “Socialist  state  property  was  more  inalienable,  more  exclusive,  more 
property than any other form, and judicial practice was to shore it up, buttressing 
its status over that of other kinds”. This superiority of state property was reflected 
in the much greater material endowment of state enterprises than of the “lower” 
cooperative form, accorded many fewer resources. 
“Cooperative  property”  consisted  of  means  of  production  “donated”  or 
pooled by individuals who had formed a cooperative. It most commonly included 
means of production in various trades’ cooperatives, the means of cultivation in 
                                          
2 I use the term “cooperative” in referring to the category that includes both agricultural and 
non-agricultural  enterprises  of  non-state  type.  When  I  wish  to  speak  of  non-state  agricultural 
enterprises, I use the term collective, as in “collective farm”, rather than speaking of “cooperative 
farms”,  since  the  term  “collective  farm”  is  the  more  widely  used  in  English  and  bears  more 
appropriate connotations.   Catherine Verdery  6  42 
collective farms, and land that people were compelled to give them (except that in 
Albania and the Soviet Union, where all land belonged to the state; collective farm 
members  jointly  owned  only  the  means  of  cultivation).    Unlike  state  property, 
which belonged to “the whole people”, cooperative property belonged only to those 
who  had  pooled  it;  their  property  rights  resembled  those  of  shareholders  in  a 
capitalist firm. State property coexisted uneasily with this form and was always 
meant to absorb it. Together, the categories of state and cooperative property made 
up  the  super-category  of  socialist  property,  which  included  nearly  all  society's 
major means of production. Socialist law linked socialist property closely with a 
third  type  –  personal  property,  which  (according  to  plan)  was  to  increase 
continually  as  part  of  projected  improvements  in  the  standard  of  living.  This 
category  consisted  primarily  of  objects  of  consumption  –  houses,  furnishings, 
automobiles, and so on. Laws constrained their use to keep people from turning 
them into means of production. For instance, one could own one's car but was 
prohibited from using it as a taxi to generate revenue, and one could not own more 
than one house lest the others be used for rental income. 
In  contrast  to  personal  property,  the  fourth  type  –  private  property  – 
concerned not consumption but means of production owned and used by petty-
commodity  producers  such  as  uncollectivized  peasants  and  trades-people  
(e.g., tailors, cobblers, or carpenters); such property was likely to be organized in 
households rather than in socialist organizations. Seen as a residue of the bourgeois 
order, private property was slated for eventual elimination and was of minimal 
importance  in  all  but  Poland  and  Yugoslavia  (where  private-property-owning 
cultivators formed the large majority of the rural population). This long-term plan 
to eliminate cooperative and private property underlay the hierarchical relations of 
property forms: state property was prior to all others and enjoyed the fullest legal 
protection, followed (in order) by cooperative, personal, and private property.   
The  three  types  of  owners  (the  “whole  people,“  cooperatives,  and 
households) were distinguished from other possible actors in that they alone were 
empowered to own and thus to appropriate. It is important to note that these actors 
were defined as jural subjects precisely by their property status. As Butler puts it 
for  the  Soviet  Union,  “Juridical  persons  are  those  organizations  which  possess 
separate property, [and] may acquire property and personal non-property rights and 
bear duties in their own name…” (1988, p. 179). Thus, jural personhood was a 
function of property status, and to be a jural person automatically entailed having 
certain property rights.  
 
ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS AND EXCHANGES OF GOODS 
 
Defined as a jural person, an entity could further allocate rights to specific 
subunits – for instance, “the state” could parcel out rights to use state property both 
to  cooperatives  and  to  other  lower-level  actors,  such  as  state  firms,  socialist 7  Property    43 
organizations (e.g., the trade unions or the Councils of National Minorities), or 
lower-level  territorial  units.  Understanding  this  is  crucial  to  understanding  how 
state ownership worked. To do so requires that we stop asking about ownership and 
look  at  the  distribution  of  various  kinds  of  rights  and  relations,  as  well  as  at 
patterns of actual use.   
The state held the dominant property rights, as I noted above. In order for it 
to be an effective actor, state property was said to form a unitary fund, inalienable 
and indivisible. It contained all means of production, including raw materials and 
circulating capital. But how did this arrangement work in practice – how could “the 
state” create production with its “unitary fund”? The most important relationship 
after the state’s ownership prerogatives was based in the so-called right of direct 
(or operational) administration – what I will refer to as “administrative rights” – 
organized in what I will call, following anthropologist Max Gluckman, a hierarchy 
of administrative estates (Gluckman 1943; Humphrey 1983). These rights were not 
exercised only at the top, however, but were allocated downward to actors at lower 
levels; some of their recipients were empowered to allocate them further. Here is 
Heller’s account of how it worked: 
Instead of assigning an owner to each object, socialist law created a complex 
hierarchy of divided and coordinated rights in the objects it defined…. The law 
integrated ownership of physical assets within overlapping state structures, often 
linking upward from a state enterprise, to a group of similar enterprises, to the local 
and  then  central  offices  of  a  ministry  responsible  for  that  branch  of  industry” 
(Heller 1998, p. 629). That is, the Communist Party planning mechanism granted 
administrative rights to ministries, state-owned enterprises, and local authorities, 
who might further allocate their administrative rights downward, in the name of 
both the Party and their bureaucratic segment or firm. The same idea appears in a 
statement  by  Romanian  legal  specialists  Lupan  and  Reghini:  “In  order  that the 
state’s property have productive effect, the socialist state institutes with respect to 
the goods belonging to it a right of direct administration, for its subunits, and a 
right of use, for cooperative organizations and physical individuals” (1977, p. 54). 
Through granting administrative rights, then, the party-state retained its claim 
to  supreme  ownership  but  exercised  that  ownership  by  allocating  use  and 
administrative rights to lower-level entities, assigning parts of the property of “the 
whole  people”  to  inferior  levels  in  the  bureaucratic  hierarchy.  Crucially,  this 
system  of  multiple  and  overlapping  administrative  rights  permitted  myriad 
transactions to occur without the institutions and forms associated in capitalism 
with changes in ownership, such as mortgages or sale contracts (Feldbrugge 1993, 
p. 231). For instance, if one state enterprise made a contract with another to deliver 
its product – say, a piece of machinery – the machinery was at  all times state 
property. Its owner did not change; all that changed was who held the power of 
administrative rights over it. Thus, the director of the first firm held the power to 
dispose of the product to the second firm – a power common to ownership relations 
– but ownership did not change thereby.     Catherine Verdery  8  44 
An important result of the patterns I have been describing was that because 
the units that received administrative rights thus entered as jural persons into direct 
relation with means of production, their managers could come dangerously close to 
infringing on the state’s property right, even treating the firm and materials as their 
fief and some of the revenue as their own. The “underground factories” reported 
for the Soviet Union, for instance, involved managers’ employing entire sections of 
the workforce and the infrastructure of the factory for production entirely on their 
own, and then keeping the proceeds. Indeed, the inability of the political center to 
keep these actors in check, and their gradually increased autonomy in consequence, 
were  critical  elements  in  socialism's  transformation  (e.g.,  Staniszkis  1989).  
Especially once central control began to weaken in the mid to late 1980s, these 
managers arrogated state powers, even selling off state assets – often to themselves.  
By  the  time  privatization  officially  commenced,  many  of  socialism's  erstwhile 
directors were well on their way to being private owners, a process that socialism’s 
hierarchy  of  administrative  estates  had  facilitated.  For  this  reason,  it  would  be 
inadvisable  to  see  administrative  rights  as  an  insignificant  form  of  property 
relation.  Their  exercise  in  practice  constituted  state  firms  –  particularly  their 
directors – as powerful actors. 
Socialist managers would exercise their administrative rights within socialist 
property in several different ways. One set involved moving around large-scale 
means of production – such as the machinery mentioned above. In agriculture this 
took the form of moving control over land among state farms, collectives, and 
individual  households.  These  practices  would  have  consequences  decades  later 
when those farms were disbanded. For example, because the early collectives had 
to show good results so as to “attract” more members, farm heads consolidated the 
pieces already donated to make compact fields of good quality that they could 
cultivate  “rationally”.  That  both  state  and  collective  farm  heads  were  able  to 
allocate rights to land at will, enjoying priority over private property rights, enabled 
them  to  reorganize  the  landscape  for  their  convenience  through  numerous  land 
exchanges.  These  were  of  three  kinds:  between  collective/state  farms  and 
individuals, between collective and state farms, and among collectives or among 
state farms. That is, the exchanges occurred across three of the four main property 
types and all three kinds of owners. 
In  Romania,  for  example,  Decree  151  (1950)  enabled  collectives-in-
formation to create contiguous parcels by exchanging land with individual private 
owners who had not yet joined the collectives. Often, the land of villagers who had 
joined the collective or its precursor did not form contiguous blocks; officials had 
the right to create these by compelling non-members with land in the middle of a 
good field to exchange it for parcels at the edge. State farms seeking to consolidate 
their fields had the same prerogative. Individuals could not refuse these exchanges, 
having to accept parcels much inferior to those they had been compelled to turn 
over. Indeed, the decree stated that the contracts for such exchanges were valid 9  Property    45 
even  without  the  signatures  of  the  owners  thus  displaced,  as  long  as  the  local 
authorities  invoked  decree  151  in  their  records.  Technically  speaking,  farm 
officials were supposed to make and archive such contracts, but often – from haste, 
or carelessness, or confidence in the supremacy of their own property form – they 
did  not.  Their  cavalier  treatment  of  land  enabled  farm  members  after  1989  to 
challenge the jural status of such earlier exchanges so as to recover their better-
quality parcels. 
In  the  same  spirit  of  rational  cultivation,  state  and  collective  farms  often 
exchanged  their  donated  or  confiscated  lands  with  each  other.  Because  farm 
directors  administered  the  property  rights  to  the  land  (albeit  via  different 
mechanisms), they could dispose of it as necessary to pursue their objectives; the 
wishes of the former owners had no place in such exchanges. Leaders could even 
enforce exchanges on private owners living in uncollectivized areas, whose private 
property lay at the bottom of the hierarchy of property forms. 
All  these  exchanges  altered  the  landscape  fundamentally,  creating  large, 
undivided fields from the intricate patchwork of tiny parcels owned by persons 
from  multiple  places.  Farm  managers  could  do  this,  moving  parcels  formerly 
owned  by  myriad  individuals  like  so  many  pieces  on  a  chessboard,  precisely 
because they enjoyed far-reaching rights to acquire and dispose of landed property, 
indifferent to the possible rights of the former private owners (and even to whether 
the land was legally state or cooperative property). Treating all collective lands as a 
single fund, farm managers could trade them with other units, without having to 
record a “property transfer” in the land registry books. After 1989, these deedless 
exchanges would create havoc for reconstituting private ownership. 
 
APPROPRIATION AND COUNTER-APPROPRIATION 
 
Another way in which socialist managers exercised their administrative rights 
involved moving around items of smaller scale – not land, for example, but bags of 
fertilizer or apples. These items might either be allocated to them as raw materials 
for  production  (fertilizer)  or  come  form  the  production  process  itself  (apples), 
destined  for  consumption.  Managers’  right  to  move  these  items  around  at  will 
contributed to one of the hallmarks of socialist political economies: widespread 
barter  and  trading  of  goods,  practices  necessary  for  production  in  socialism’s 
“economies  of  shortage”  (see  Kornai  1980;  Verdery  1996,  ch.  1).  Managers’ 
behavior could aggravate this shortage, for they operated within soft rather than 
hard budget constraints and also within plans, which assigned them production 
targets;  therefore  enterprises  hoarded  their  materials.  In  all  types  of  firms, 
managers struggled to secure extra resources and to hide them from state agents 
who  came  expressly  to  squeeze  them  back  out  into  the  state  property  funds.  
Because  glitches  in  socialist  planning  and  distribution  could  prevent  managers 
from mobilizing the necessary raw materials for the level of production expected of   Catherine Verdery  10  46 
them, they not only demanded more inputs than they needed but held onto any 
excess they received or were able to produce themselves. Technically speaking, it 
was only the managers holding administrative rights to state property who could do 
this with one another, but in practice they were linked in giant trading networks 
with the managers of cooperative enterprises (like collective farms) as well.   
If enterprise  managers helped to generate shortage  by hoarding, however, 
they also strove to reduce its effects by widespread barter. They traded with other 
managers whatever they might have in excess supply in exchange for inputs they 
needed. Although these practices did not fully alleviate the problem of obtaining 
resources for production, since one could not always count on covering all one’s 
needs through one's network at the necessary times, they became an integral and 
time-consuming  part  of  socialist  production  in  both  agricultural  and  industrial 
settings. Reforms introduced in each East European country during the 1960s and 
’70s  modified  economic  organization  and  sought  to  make  managers m o r e  
accountable  for  their  production  costs,  without,  however,  eliminating  these 
horizontal trading networks. After 1989, those networks would prove to be sources 
of “social capital” – and they would be an effect of the exercise of administrative 
rights within socialist property.  
This  far-flung  system  of  exchange  rested  on  the  personal  relations  of 
enterprise directors. It involved both items necessary for production and also the 
exchange of favors and gifts that might enable a director to obtain needed goods at 
a later time. Such exchanges formed a kind of of “gift economy” that oiled the 
joints of the socialist economy. The gifts often came from the production process 
itself – especially in agriculture, where directors appropriated immense quantities 
of apples, vegetables, or grain to send to their cronies and party superiors. The 
return on such gifts might be looser plan targets, special bonuses, access to raw 
materials otherwise hard to obtain, or generalized goodwill. Moreover, as Caroline 
Humphrey has brilliantly shown (1983), participation in such exchanges might be 
crucial to obtaining effort from those in one’s workforce. What made the exchanges 
possible to begin with, however, was the granting of administrative rights, which 
entailed managerial discretion over the use of various kinds of socialist property.   
Such personalization of items from the socialist property fund was rampant 
throughout socialist economies. As Martha Lampland has argued (1995, p. 262–266), 
even  to  call  it  “personalization”  may  misrepresent  the  reality, f o r  t h e  l i n e  
separating personal gain from the pursuit of advantage for one's unit was often 
difficult  to  draw.  Moreover,  officials  who  engaged  in  such  behavior  were  not 
protecting only themselves: they were creating an umbrella for whole retinues of 
their own – virtually the entire leadership group of the collective, for example, or at 
least  the  director's  faction  within  it.  And  they  were  helping  to  make  similar 
umbrellas for their superiors, in vast pyramids of patronage that reached to the top 
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A major consequence of these practices, however, was that the boundaries 
within the unitary fund of property became blurred, and objects might move among 
numerous  persons  exercising  with  respect  to  them  rights  that  were  akin  to 
ownership rights but were not consecrated as such. For example, two firms that 
regularly traded raw materials for production, such as a shoe factory and a factory 
that made leather coats, might not have clear boundaries around their “inventory”, 
since the goods in any firm’s fund of circulating capital were fungible, enabling 
timely substitution of materials from other enterprises.  Distinctions between state 
and cooperative property were irrelevant in this huge “unitary fund” of socialist 
property; means of production and product as well belonged to “everyone”, but 
particularly to those who managed social resources. The “fuzziness” of boundaries 
around socialist property makes determining both the ownership and the assets of 
either firm a complex process.   
My discussion so far has shown how socialist  managers used the  official 
system  of  administrative  rights  to  accomplish  their  goals  while  oiling  it  with 
unofficial exchanges so it would work. I also observed that these exchanges might 
entail removing from circulation large portions of the goods their units produced.  
What about the members of these enterprises, the people whose land and labor 
made everything possible? How did they feel about socialist property and all that 
managerial  maneuvering?  At  the  bottom  level  of  the  hierarchy  of  estates,  the 
struggle over conflicting forms of appropriation came to a head. It was here that 
managers” strategies for making their enterprises produce might set them at odds 
with  their  direct  producers.  We  see  this  especially  well  with  something  that 
occurred in all types of socialist firms: “theft”. I will illustrate it with theft from 
collective farms. 
The total product of a collective farm was finite and could support only so 
many destinations. If farm directors gave priority to delivering on their contracts 
and to the gift economy, there could be little left for paying members. Indeed, the 
chronic complaint of collective farm members in nearly every country was that 
their work was woefully underpaid. This fact led them to leave  agriculture for 
industry, if they could, and, in a “natural” form of counter-appropriation, to take 
things from the collective. Inspiring this was the example of their superiors, whose 
behavior made it fairly easy to see the collective product as “ours” for the taking. 
Although theft of socialist property was punishable by much heavier penalties than 
theft of personal property, villagers never saw their farm president sanctioned for 
the uses he made of their collective product. How could one distinguish “theft” 
from “gifts”, in such circumstances? 
In this way, when the heads of socialist firms unofficially moved goods into 
the  socialist  gift  economy,  they  further  blurred  the  boundaries  within  socialist 
property. Their self-interested notion of collective ownership or at least collective 
entitlement generalized downward from those who were not prosecuted for it to 
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potatoes or a sack of corn from their places of work. Even if laws to this effect 
were rarely applied, abundant anecdotes attest to a climate of constant vigilance by 
farm  officials  and  to  the  constant  concern  of  members  about  being  caught.  
Villagers who engaged in these practices generally presented themselves as having 
a right to take from the collective – indeed, some claimed that it was inappropriate 
to use the word “theft” for such behavior (e.g., Humphrey 1983, p. 136). They saw 
their collective property as producing goods that belonged to them and to which 
they had a right, even if they sometimes had to appropriate those goods on their 
own. In this respect, theft of CF products was a defense of their personal property 
right against what they saw as illegitimate appropriation by farm officials.   
When  villagers  were  prosecuted  for  theft  of  collective  farm  produce,  two 
fundamentally different conceptions of ownership came into conflict, conceptions 
rooted in one’s place in the political hierarchy. “Theft” as a construct presupposes a 
system of clearly defined persons, objects, and boundaries that separate them; theft 
is a violation of those boundaries, as one agent takes something from a bounded 
fund of objects to which another agent lays claim. In the official organization of 
socialist  property,  the  system  of  boundaries  was  three-tiered.  The  strongest 
boundary separated the “patrimony” of “the whole people” (the entire country) 
from  that  of  other  countries.  Inside  that  boundary  was  another  one  separating 
socialist from private property; for purposes of this discussion, that boundary was 
the most consequential. Within socialist property there was yet another boundary, 
very  weak  and  rarely  observed  in  practice,  separating  state  from  cooperative 
property. Actors could appropriate the socialist product by moving things upward 
(across the boundaries between private and socialist, or collective and state) or 
laterally within a given category. What was unacceptable to the authorities was any 
movement of goods downward across the boundary between socialist property and 
lower types. That was theft. Party officials did plenty of it, but those appropriations 
often disappeared into the much larger flow of gifts and tribute upward. In equating 
their  own  appropriations  with  those  of  officials,  collective  farmers  made  the 
mistake  of  not  realizing  that  what  mattered  was  the  direction  in  which  their 
appropriations moved.   
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
I have been arguing that contrary to Frydman and Rapaczynski’s claim (see 
epigraph)  about  socialism’s  “not  having  any  property  system”,  it  had  a  very 
complex  one.  To  grasp  that  system  has  required  setting  aside  questions  about 
ownership and looking at patterns of use, administrative rights, and social networks 
of  appropriation,  exchange,  and  reciprocity.  Laws  and  administrative  measures 
defined a specifically socialist property regime encompassing both agricultural and 
industrial  production,  in  both  state  and  cooperative  enterprises.  To  solve  the 
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parties  established  hierarchies  of  administrative  and  productive  estates,  held 
together by delegating administrative rights. These rights (the most important form 
of property right in socialism) were intended to link the different legal property 
types  and  to  establish  specific  relations  to  values  and  goods.  Translated  into 
practice, however, these ceased to serve as rights over things but entered into social 
relations  that  privileged  rights  over  people.  Extended  networks  of  reciprocity 
moved products upwards, laterally, and downwards, all in the service of collecting 
people whose goodwill, trades of raw material, protection, patronage, and effort 
would  put  socialism’s  productive  means  into  motion.  Those  patterns,  however, 
placed multiple demands on the social product and generated an ongoing struggle – 
more intense in countries such as Romania and Albania than in others – around 
appropriation at the bottom. Here the politics of appropriation within the hierarchy 
of estates in socialism’s property regime came full circle. 
This  organization  of  property  had  major  implications  for  the  postsocialist 
property order that would take shape after 1989, particularly in agriculture. The 
policies  of  decollectivization  initiated  then  aimed  to  undo  the  system  I  have 
described and to create or recreate private property, the form most disdained in 
socialist planning. How does my discussion here prepare us for the problems this 
transformation would encounter? I will suggest three general points that I believe 
are  applicable  to  some  extent  for  all  postsocialist  countries.  They  concern  the 
evaluation of socialist assets, the hierarchy of property types, and the relation of 
administrative to legal regulation. 
As  a  property  regime,  socialist  property  instituted  an  entirely n e w  s e t  o f  
values, based in an ideological opposition between “socialism” and “capitalism”. 
The values I have noted here were 1) administrative rights (rather than market 
forces) as the basis for moving goods and assessing their worth; 2) a hierarchy of 
actors and statuses, with the state at the top managing the patrimony of “the whole 
people”,  smaller  cooperative  entities  holding  common  resources,  and  private 
property in households at the bottom; and 3) the priority of an administrative over a 
juridical  definition  of  property.  Each  of  these  sets  of  values  would  have 
consequences for postsocialist property transformation. 
I begin with the movement of goods by administrative means. Socialism’s 
property regime established among people and goods a set of relations that did not 
rest mainly on a commodity basis. One goal, of course, was to erect a bulwark 
between the socialist and capitalist worlds, to protect local resources from being 
sucked into external capitalist markets. Serving that end were the strictures against 
any form of alienating socialist property, even by the party-state itself, and the 
insistence on the integrity of the unitary fund belonging to the whole people and 
administered by cadres. Thus protected from the market, the resources controlled 
and  appropriated  within  socialist  property  relations  were  subject  to  evaluative 
criteria driven not by the market but by politics (e.g., what one’s patron wanted, 
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profitable  an  activity  might  be).  Under  these  arrangements,  it  was  exceedingly 
difficult to assess the “book value” of firms being privatized, since the state, as the 
ultimate holder of financial obligation, had absorbed most of the liabilities of its 
subordinate firms, and the materials a given firm utilized in production were so 
often not those the state had allocated to it. After 1989, the problems of evaluating 
the assets of socialist enterprise, including both state and collective farms, would 
defeat even the smartest economists. Questions of value, from the most basic (what 
kind of life do people want to live) to the niggling details of a firm’s purchase 
price, joined with questions of morality to dominate public consciousness. Who 
ought or ought not to be profiting from the wealth accumulated under socialism—
the former managers of state firms? foreigners? the general public? 
Some answers to these questions came from a second aspect of the socialist 
property regime: its creation of a ranked hierarchy of forms, with those of the state 
at  the  top,  cooperative/collective  forms  second,  and  individuals/households 
(especially those with private property) at the bottom. This hierarchy produced a 
very powerful class of state-enterprise directors benefiting maximally from state 
resources and from their control of administrative rights over these. Even before 
1989 they had begun using these rights to decompose state property from within, 
thereby weakening the political center (see Staniszkis 1989). As that center grew 
weaker, the power of these directorial networks intensified. In short, socialism's 
property regime gave a decisive edge in the postsocialist era to a specific group of 
actors:  state  enterprise  directors.  They  were  used  to  manipulating  the  fuzzy 
boundaries  of  socialist  property,  to  moving  resources  around  to m a x i m u m  
advantage.  They  disposed  of  large  funds  of  social  capital,  in  the  form  of  their 
networks, and of cultural capital, in the form of their higher education and more 
extensive experience with the most modern technology their national economies 
could  support.  In  agriculture  specifically,  we  see  the  advantage  o f  s t a t e  o v e r  
collective  property  in  the  greater  cultural  and  social  capital  of  state  than  of 
collective farm heads. State farm directors had wider circles of connections, more 
complex managerial experience, greater familiarity with new farming technology, 
better-endowed farms from which to strategize their exit, and so on, all owing to 
the higher position of state over cooperative property forms. Although international 
blueprints called for privatizing ownership rights, these socialist managers began 
by privatizing only their administrative rights, enabling them to avoid the liabilities 
of ownership by shucking those off onto the state, while still drawing upon central 
investments.   
In this they were aided by socialism’s overlapping estates of administration, 
which  had  socialized  responsibility  so  thoroughly  that  the  buck  never  stopped 
anywhere but continued to circulate in “gifts”. They were aided, as well, by the 
alliances these circulating gifts entailed. Networks of directors, as Stark (1996) has 
shown, could use their administrative advantage to resist competitive privatizations 
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worked to keep foreigners out. Indeed, Stark suggests, the unit for privatization 
ought  never  to  have  been  made  the  individual  firm  but,  rather,  the  interfirm 
network. In some countries these networks would generate viable capitalist firms; 
in others, they would obstruct the privatization process, even using it to fortify their 
power  by  continuing  to  surround  themselves  with  retinues  of  petitioners.  This 
resistance would make it difficult to create the property “bundle” so dear to the 
advocates of private property and would perpetuate use-right arrangements similar 
to those of  the hierarchy of administrative estates. Although it is not surprising that 
state enterprise directors tended to fare well in the postsocialist period, my purpose 
here  has  been  to  show  how  their  future  success  was  already  inscribed  in  the 
property regime of socialism, as was the disadvantage of certain others.  
Finally, I turn to the party-state’s preference for politico-administrative over 
legal  procedures.  This  preference  entailed  making  decrees  and  administrative 
decisions about the use of resources but not necessarily ratifying these decisions by 
the legal procedures that had governed property transformation in pre-communist 
times.  Region-wide,  1989  initiated  a  process  of  reversing  this  set  of  priorities, 
attempting  to  create  the  “law-governed  state”.  The  logistical  nightmares 
encountered in that process were legion. To illustrate, I will discuss an example 
involving the ownership status of the land held in collective farms (which, as I 
noted, was not state-owned in most countries but belonged to the members jointly).  
During the socialist period, land was administratively moved around more or 
less at will among collectives, state farms, and households; because who “owned” 
it was rarely an issue, officials generally did not record the changes by inscription 
in the land registers when they exchanged parcels or modified land use.  But after 
1989,  ownership  suddenly  mattered  very  much.  Had  the  members  relinquished 
ownership rights altogether upon joining the collective, or did those rights maintain 
some  kind  of  shadow  existence  throughout?  What  did  the  joint  ownership  of 
cooperatives actually mean, from a legal point of view? Did membership mean 
transferring actual title to physical land or, rather, transmuting that into ownership 
of shares, comparable to the rights of membership in a corporation, as suggested by 
Linda Miller (personal communication)?   
Post-1989  legislators  argued  these  questions  at  length,  and  the a n s w e r s  
differed by country, as did the ownership status of collective farm land (see Knapp 
1975). For Romania, lawyers with whom I discussed the issue gave contradictory 
accounts, as do Romanian law books.  Writing about the status of cooperative land 
as part of their discussion of decollectivization, two Ministry of Agriculture legal 
specialists state both that “the cooperative appeared as the titulary of the property 
right and thus exercised possession, use, and alienation over lands of any kind in its 
patrimony” and that “the land continued to remain the property of the cooperative 
member” (Scrieciu and Chercea 1996, pp. 524, 534). The matter was crucial, for 
the  answer  to  it  would  affect  the  policy  options  for  property  reform.    If  farm 
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“law-governed state” could only confirm their ownership, rather than (re)create it. 
That is, collectives would have to be unmade by restituting or reconstituting prior 
ownership  rights,  rather  than  by  impropriating  owners  or  distributing  the  land 
exclusively to people who lived in villages, or by some other kind of land reform.  
Indeed,  restitution  would  require  no  separate  law,  merely  the  members’  joint 
declaration to dissolve the collective, at which point everything would revert to the 
status quo ante. – Never mind the complexities of discovering what that was, after 
so  many  years  of  exchanging  land,  erasing  boundaries,  and  transforming  the 
landscape (see Verdery 1996, ch. 6). 
The more significant underlying issue, however, is this: from the vantage 
point of what mode of regulation – legal, or politico-administrative – should the 
question  be  answered?  Although  law  did  have  its  place  in  the  socialist  system 
(increasingly so, as time went on), “legality” simply did not have the same status or 
legitimating  function  in  the  socialist  property  system  that  it  has  in  market 
democracies. Property law was a supplement to the more active principle, property 
administration. Moving from such a regime to one supposedly grounded in law and 
judicial  process  raised  innumerable  difficulties  concerning  whether  and  how  to 
translate administrative decrees into the language of the law in order to formulate 
policy. Can we select out the “law-governed“ aspects of the socialist system and 
build a new one upon those?  Or must we retroactively legalize that system – even 
though the premise of the 1989 events was its illegitimacy – in order to proceed? 
For those who regard the entire communist period as illegitimate, none of its 
acts has legal status.  Hence, trying to determine and reverse the legal effects of an 
administrative decree is pointless; one need only make new laws. The weaknesses 
of this position include the following. To declare the acts of the socialist period 
illegal ignores the judicial maxim of tempus regit actum, which posits that the 
status of an action in its original context should govern how it is regarded now. If 
an administrative decree “acquired the force of law”, as we might translate it, then 
those effects should be taken seriously in disposing of present ownership claims.  
Moreover, dismissing the entire socialist period as illegal wreaks havoc on a notion 
of  law-governed  practice  rooted  in  predictability  and  continuity:  how  can  one 
simply  hop  over  the  intervening  “illegal”  45  years  and  assert  new  ownership, 
without compromising the principle of a just claim?   
The  alternative  is  to  recast  the  acts  of  that  period  in  terms  that  permit 
continuity, even if to do so is to legitimize the system one seeks to displace. That 
is, restitution builds political legitimacy paradoxically: instead of playing up the 
illegitimacy of the old regime, it may require first legalizing the status of property 
under socialism so as to return rights to previous owners. The status of land in 
Hungary, Transylvania, and Slovakia offers a particularly clear example. There, the 
Habsburg-derived system of land registration meant that no transaction could be 
performed except on the basis of a previous legal transaction recorded in the land 
register. For me to receive back a parcel of land upon which the collective farm 
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into the register as belonging to the collective farm and then re-register it in my 
name. This procedure effectively legalizes the seizure of my parcel and the new use 
to which it was then put – that is, the procedure runs directly counter to the premise 
of unlawful seizure upon which restitution is based!   
The  work  involved  in  retroactively  legalizing  45  years  of  transactions, 
however, would be unmanageable. The complexities relate not only to the legal 
status of different kinds of resources but also to the weak or fuzzy boundaries that 
characterized socialist property. Lacking clear edges, it was held together by social 
relations  that  were  reticular  and  rhizomatic,  that  worked  across  property  types. 
Those uncertain edges could be advantageous, as David Stark (1996) has argued 
for “recombinant property”. In agriculture, they could also produce chaos. All the 
moving  around  of  resources,  the  exchanges  of  parcels,  the  hiding  of  land,  the 
erasure  of  field  boundaries;  all  the  uncertainties  about  the  ownership  status  of 
collective and state farm land; all the failures to write land transactions into the 
land register – these would make it extremely difficult to reestablish ownership 
rights once socialism was ended.   
In  this  essay  I  have  presented  property  in  and  after  socialism  as  a 
quintessentially political matter – as part of a political economy. The politics of 
property  resided  at  many  levels:  in  the  new  mechanisms  of  appropriation  that 
socialist property forms enabled; in the political relations of subordination and the 
administrative rights accompanying them; in the political values determining the 
hierarchy  of  owners  and  of  property  types;  in  the  appropriations  of  productive 
resources  by  socialist  managers  helping  their  allies  and  currying  favor  with 
patrons;  and  in  the  counter-appropriations  by  various  kinds  of  workers.  These 
forms of politics in property shaped the trajectory of ownership that would emerge 
after 1989, as managers attempted to retain certain features of socialist property so 
as to drain state subsidies into their newly private firms; as persons well situated in 
the hierarchy of property types would often find themselves well situated to move 
into  new  forms  of  ownership,  at  the  expense  of  others  less  favored;  as  local 
officials would manipulate the uncertainty about prior ownership to deny some 
people's claims in favor of their clients and friends (see Verdery 2004). The extent 
to which property transformation would be politicized and the means of doing so 
varied  from  one  country  to  another.  In  all,  however,  its  politicization  under 
socialism  would  shape  the  outcome,  affecting  as  well  the  legitimacy  of  a 
postsocialist property regime. 
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